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I THE U S T  STAND OF DIALECTIC MATERIAu~' 
A Study of Sidney Hook's Marxism 
Eightp-five yean  after the Mamian theory was propotllldc4 
and fifteen pears after Lenin and the Bolsheviks, acting up- . 
its principles, overthrew an empire and laid the foundationr' : 
of a socialist society, a gifted young philomphcr arises to tell . 
us for the first time what Marx meant by what he said. The 
yowig man is John Dewey's favorite pupil, Sidney Hook, rmu- 
thor of a compact little book, The MetaphysiCJ Of Pragmatism, 
s 1. in which Dewey's philosophy is extended with original sk& 
And what Mam meant by what be said, according to Sidney t 
Hook, is substantially identical with Dewey's philosophy, which 
be is careful to identify as "scientific pragmatism" in contraet 
to the "mystical pragmatism" of WiUiarn Junes. 
I think the significance of this event has been missed both 
by Hook's friends and by those irate priests of the or&& 
faith who have of course denounced him as a "petty bourgeois 
ddntion." H e  is something far more instructive than that, 
if you msider the exact nature of his exploit. 
"It is Marx's meaning that must first be discovered," he 
hginrs, "before we ask whether his teachjhga arc true or false. 
. , . It is an open question whether Marx's opponents have mom 
violtntly distorted his doctrine8 than his orthodm friends. But 
as to whether both have radically misunderstood him there 
scms to me to be no question at all."* 
And by "orthodox friends" Sidney Hook doe$ not mean 
only the remoter ones, Laf argue, Liebhecht, Rosa Lwembourg, 
b i n ,  Trotsky, Plektranov, but dso Friedrich Engefa, Marx'r 
cloac bosom companion and the cwreator of his datrine. Em 
I gels not ody misconstrued the argument of Das Kapitd, but "in his exposition of Mam's philosophic position" commitpbd 
I The M& Of M h ,  The M e d m  Q w f i ~ l y ,  VoL 5, Ha 4. 3 
. w - 7  ,y - 4 
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deviation from M a d s  views."* And not only 
. . bt Ma= himse l f i f  wc may add our mitt to Hook's 
dilrovcry-failed to bear his own meaning in mind, 
Engcls' principal deviation read to him for his a p  
pronounced it good 
~7 -2: It would be easy to smile away the presumption of this 
--- 2 I 
.L 
- - 
.young man who alone knows, and knows better than Marx did, 
;_ what he mtmt by what he said. But that would be superficial, 
& as a personal judgment, erroneous. Sidney Hook is trying ? paliantly, and with a ztorlous love for the mind of Karl Mam, 
L to defend his philosophy and make it stick fast in an age and 
, '  
. . 
nation that is sceptical of supcr+3cicntific philosophies. He is 
making a last stand in defense of dialectic materialism against 
the attitude and methods of modern science. He alone of all 
those defending this philosophy is acutely aware of the gulf 
between its classic formulations and the modcrn scientific point- 
of-view. H e  alone is boId enough to throw overboard as non- 
Marxian dl these classic formulations-cspecially those of the 
Russians who took the philosophic srde most seriously-and 
go back to Marx himself, who did not formulate it, and to 
whom therefore ht can, with a more plausible success, ascribe 
whatever progressive views he finds essential. 
Sidney Hook has two faults of miad, or faciIities, which 
help him in this operation. One is a tendency toward pedantry 
--that disposition to  employ large terms for simple concepts 
md display learning for its own sake, which makes scholarly 
controversy rso often resemble a dog a h o w i f  you can imagine 
dqp barking largely about their own superior points in a com- 
ptitive display. In these artides on Marxism, for instance, 
Hook keeps his opponents under a veritable barrage-fire of 
erudite terminology, describing Marx's philosophy not only as 
dialtctic materialism, which seemed good enough to Marx, but 
aa "nqturahtic actiGrm," "social bthaviorism," "revolutionary 
voluntarim,'' '4voluntaristic humanism,'' L'voluntaristic realism," 
"advistic atheism," "critical bistoricism," "realistic evolutionary 
naturalism," "Aristotdiallim saturated with temporalism," and 
o&cr lollg-tailed horny epithets very disheartening to a man not 
accustomed to take his vacations in a library. And he frightens 
T h  T& U- Of Karl M m ,  The Sym#tiotn, July, 1931. 
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them out of their wiu with 
mation as that Mam did not 
what wc mean by science, and 
discussion as to whether Marxism is a science or not'' 
oif its base.* Were he not merely deploying em 
purposes of schreckiichkeit, Mr. Hook could hardly fa 
that our discussion is as to whether Marx was what 
by scientific or not, and that therefore the explosion o 
h *cant does not knock us flat. .- ' I
However, it is not Hook's academic s c h r e c r 8 l i c k k ~ t - a l a ~  - 
ing as it is to a rather fitful scholar like myself-that ir m W  
. 
dangerous in his enterprise of reinterpreting Mamidm It: ib 
the infrequency with which he adoptil a genuine attitude of . 4 I 
'E inquiry. He seems always to be sold to some idea, and udng , his nimble facukies in order to win out, not only over opponen+, I 
but over documents and facts. I 
A CASUISTRY OF OMISSION 
It seems to me, for instance, a kind of cawistry not & ;' 
point out, when you art convicting Engels of a '4definite d&s- 
, 
tion" from Marx's views, that Marx read over and stppm* 
wants us to believe that Marx invented a new methMo1agy in 
18 tbe principal work in which this deviation m r r e d .  H d  =, 
the social sciences resting upon a "functional" and not a "cqf ! theorp of knowledge, and that Engels, who worked with him 
alt his life long, was unaware of this, and Marx hiiself so 
- forgetful of his own "distinctive contribution to the history of 
thoughtw* that when Engels presented for his approval a f o d  
=position of their views containing the old copy theory, he 
made no demur. Tbe tale is improbable, and Hook holds badr 
its most improbable detail. 
"Since the views deveIoptd here were in far thc greater 
part originated and develo ed by Marx," says Enge.1~ in a pref- 
I 
I 
ace to the Rsti-Duhring, 4 nd only in the smaUest part by mel 
- 
'* T h  M d m  Q u a r t d y ,  Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 431. 
I I 
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.* 
was self-uuderstood between us that this exposition of mine 
d d  aot be completed without his cognizance. I read the 
e manuscript to him before publication, and the tenth chap- 
of thc -ion about economics . . . was written by Marx." 
In dimming EngcIs' "deviation" in this book, Hook is 
eful to remind us that Marx wrote a chapter, but omits to 
mention that Marx heard and approved the rest. 
It seems to  me also an evidence of the non-inquiring mind 
that Hook ahodd forget, in discussing this matter, Marx's own 
avowal of a copy theory of knowledge in that celebrated passage 
in his aecond preface to Capital, where for once he speaks in 
his own voice about his own philosophy. 
"My diatettic is not only fundamentally different from that 
of HegeI, but its direct opposite. For Hegel the thought-process 
which under the name of Idea he converts into an independent 
subject, is the derniurgos of thc real world, which forms only 
its outer appearaict. With me, the other way round, the ideal ie 
nothing else than the material transformed and translated in 
the human head.'' 
Marx does not, to be sure, use the word copy or ''reflec- 
tion" here, as his American translator docs, but he gives no 
reason to suppose that he does not mean the same thing that 
Engels does in his corresponding passage : 
"We rt-conceived the ideas in our heads matcrialisticaIly, 
as copies of real things, instead of real things as copies of this 
or that stage of the Absolute Idea. . . . Thereupon the dialectic 
of ideas.bccamt itself only a conscious reflection of the dialectic 
movement of the reaI world, and thereby the Hcgelian dialectic 
wan iltood on its head, or rather upon its feet, for it was already 
standing on its Read."* 
You see how united the two minds were. 
A TEXT MISREAD 
Hook has only one .ground fo calling this copy theory a 
"dtvirrtion" from Marx. His wh d e argument rests on those 
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Theses On Fcuerboch where Marx is commenting, in I&@' 
"hastily scribbled down,"* on Feuerbach's s d d  'w. - :. 
ism"--his attempt to cast off the idealist philosophy df H&- ' 
and reconcile his religious emoti 
of the world. Feuerbach managed 
Hegel's opinin about the compara 
sense-experience. In order to reach 
cording to Hegel, it is necessary to depart from ~ense-e 
(generally referred to as Sinnlichksit) in the direction of 
Feuerbach simply asserted that, on the contrary, s e n ~ e r i m c c  
is the real thing, and ideas are secondary. 
"Truth, reality, sensibility,'' he cried, "are identical . , . . 
Only sensibility is truth and reality. Where there is no sense, 
there is no being, no real object."** 
This gave him a feeling that he was on solid ground, that 
. hc was back in the real world where straight-talking practical 
men live. But he further observed that men do not have even 
rsensaexperience without some flicker of feeling, some interested 
attention. And by playing up &is fact, he managed to drag in 
4 4  passion" under the concept of sensibility, and arrive at the 
conclusion-astonishing enough to one not solely concerned to 
validate the Christian emotion-that "Only that atis which is an 
object of passion." And with a littIe more obscuring of diatine 
dons, sufficiently important to a realistic mind, he contrived to 
make this read: "Not to love and not to be are identical." 
Which is, for emotional purposes, equivalent to the older saying: 
"God is love." 
In this operation it is quite obvious that Feuerbach had 
to pIay fast and loose with the distinction between sensation and 
the objects of sensation. And that, of course, is what he did 
In his principal theoretic work, Grundsltze der Philosophic dm 
Zrrkunft, he used the word "sensibilitp" indifferently in both 
meanings. It is equally obvious, however, that his metaphysics of 
love will hold water, if a t  ail, only so long as he ignores the inda 
pendent existence of the object and sticks to the identification of 
"sensibiIity" with the material reality of the world. "Truth," 
he must maintain, as he d&s indeed say, "is onIy the totality 
. - 
hgels in the Introduction to Ludwig Fmr*bacA 
H G d ~ a c  dcr Fhiloaopkk dm Z u h f l .  
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af hutam lift and experience." And he did in the main dwell 
in this p o s i t i ~ t  least until long after Marx TR$B through 
6th bim, when in his Esscact of Religion he took that step 
which he himself described as "no less than a leap . . . from 
the Gothic cathedral of man's being to the heathen temple of 
Even there he failed in his effort to grant independent 
~eality to nature, as may be seen in his statement: "Sensibility 
means to me the true, not thought and not created, but existing 
unity of the material and spiritual, and is therefore with me 
the same thing BS reality.'' For our purposes, therefore, the 
I drift of Feuerbach's "materialism" is contained in the earlier 
- 
statement: "Truth, reality, sensibility are identical. . . . Only 
- sensibility is truth and reality. Where there L no sense, there 
is no . . . real object." 
NOW 1et US see what comment Marx "hastily scribbled 
downt* after studying this peculiarly half-hearted materialism. 
Mane accepted without protest the off-hand identification of 
, I  scnwptrience with objective reality, but remarked that 
Feuerbach had failed to conceive this "truth, reaIi ty, sensibility," 
n-sensible activity3'-had failed, 
ly." Here is a11 that Marx said 
"The chief fauh of a11 materialism heretofore (induding 
Fcuerbach's) is that the object, reality, sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) , 
is conceived only under the form of object or of contemplation; 
not as human-sensible activity, Praxis, not subjectively. Hence 
the active side developed in opposition to  materialism abstractly 
from idtsrl is~bstractly,  because idealism naturally did not 
recognize real sensible activity as such. Feuerbach wants objects 
of sense really distinguished from objects of thought, but he 
does not conceive of human activity itself as objective activity." 
And again :-"Feutrbach, dissatisfied with abstract thought, 
wmta contemplation (sense apprehension) ; but he does not 
conceive the sensible as practical human-sensible activity." 
And still again:-"The highest point reached by contem- 
pIativc materialism, that is, materialism which does not conceive 
sensibility as practical activity, is the contemplation of separate 
individual8 and bourgeois society." 
A STUDY OF SIDNEY HOOK'S MMXHM - 1 ' 
On the basis of these statcmenta, H d  mrts that - h h  
' .-q disagreed with Feucrbach'r belief that "rematimu were lmrmP : - : 
edge-bearing repam of the objective world." For- Mlrrsg dihs 6 
, says, sensations were "not knowledge but stimuli to howl-'' T 
.enabling mcn to "react upon and change their conditioning .- 
_cnvironrnent." And he asserts that EngeIs deviated from thb - 
wisdom in accepting "the crude formula of Fcutrbach according 
to which sensations are images and copies . . . of, the extend. 
world."* 
I do not know whether to be more astounded, here, st 
the bad scholarship or the dazzling imagination. The remark 
about Feurbach shows mere superficial reading, or no r e a h  
at all. Any good history of the matter will tell you that Ftuer- 
bach never confronted the problem of tbe relation of mind to 
the external world (Hirffding's History of Philosophy, for in- 
stance.). But if you read even a few sentences of Feutrbach's 
own vital writing, you will see that he could not confront thh 
problem without sacrificing that anthropological philosophy, or 
philosophy of human love, to install which in the place of 
theology was the goal and motive of his whole life's work. 
More impressive than this allusion to a non-existent "mdc 
formula of Feuerbach," however, is Sidney Hook's wild flight 
of imagination in regard to Mam His love for the idea of 
Marx's mind seems here to go over into blind infatuation. He 
seems simply to shut his eyes and wiiI to believe that Marx 
knew all that man can know. M a n  did not say that senss- 
tions are not knowledge-bearing reports of the external 
world, nor did hc sap that sensations are stimuli to 
knowledge, nor did he say that they enable us to react on and 
change the external world. He said, on the contrary, as plainly 
as words can say it, tbat sensations and the external world are 
the, same thing, and that that thing is to be conceived subjec- 
t W y  as practical Ausaaa?ressibk activity, A centu y of cdture 
-a century and a hemisphcrc4ie between these statements 
and those that Hook attributes to him. This hastily jotted 
note of Mam is extremely Hegelian. It reveals a mind not 
haif-way emerged from the idealist philosophy. 
Of course, Marx did come farther over into the common. 
Smpdum, July, 1931. 
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sense view of the world than these words imply. In their 
matured reflections, neither Marx nor Engels identified human 
sensation with the objective reality of things. Neither if you 
take his word for it, did Feuerbach. 
"A human being," said Feuerbach, "is a creature who is 
distinguished from the sun, moon and stars, from stones, ani- 
mals and vegetables, in a word, from those beings which he 
designates by one general name, 'nature'. Consequently, his 
imager or perceptions of the sun, moon and stars and other 
natural beings, although products of nature, are yet distinct 
from those objects in nature of which they are the perceptions." 
And Engeb asserts more than once that our "sense-impressions," 
II as well as our "thoughts1' and "ideas," are "copies," or re- 
fl;cctions" of an external reality. Indeed, he once expressly 
contradicts M a d s  statement that they should be conceived 
"subjectively." "Insofar as our sense perceptions are confirmed 
by experience," he says, "they are not 'subjective' . . . " Lenin 
is quite right when he asserts that "the doctrine of the inde- 
pendence of the outer world from consciousness is the funda- 
mental proposition of materialism." And he is justified in sum- 
ming up the mature Marxian view as follows: "Things exist 
outside of us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. The 
verification of these images, the distinction of true and false 
images, is given by practice." 
How shall we reconcile this with Marx's hastily scribbled 
thesis which identifies "reality" and the "object" with sensibil- 
ity, or aease perception? In exactly the way Marx would, of 
course-by understanding the thing in its historic development. 
Anyone in a state of youthful revolt ap*nst Hegel's mystical 
assertion that the essential reality is idea, and that in order to 
embrace reality in its purity we must move away from the crude 
impressions of the senses, from "Sidchkeit," is naturally going 
to shout: "Sinnlichkeit-that is truth, reality. That is the real 
object. The thoughtsbject is what is unreal." That is what 
Feuerbach shouted, and that is what M a n  repeated after him. 
That is what the Theses On Feuerbmh are about. They do 
not even touch upon the true problem of a materialist philosophy 
as it appears to one who comes to it from the side of s c i e n c e  
the problem of the relation between sense-impressions and out 
. ' - 2 *:..FW 
.: - . 
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, d comes a l p  aa far rre Marx had in, S~W 
s nat yet &st. He ia medy comcmcd w 
validity of body as against spirit, of sensation 
In my opinion, the dialectical materialists have n m r  
~ d y  confronted the true problem of materiafisrn. The proof 
' ttrot thcy have not is that thcy continue to lump "aensatian~ and 
idcss" together and merely to assert that the mind aB a wh~le, 
or 'L~~nscio~~ness ,"  is r copy or reflection of the external world. 
If you arc going to confront the problem as it arises oat of 
ruenc+aar Galileo raised it, in the first place, with his assertion 
that tastes, odors, sounds$ heat, and so fortb, art not objectively 
red-your first step will be to recognize the increasing diver- 
gence between sense-impressions and conceptual knowledge. 'Ib 
a scientific m i n k  mind realIy liberated from the idealist p4iL 
osoophy or unscathed by it, and not troubled at all to prove that 
the world is not a Divine Spirit-that divergence forms the 
the starting-point, of the question what ths 
rld is. Neither Engels nor Lenin, nor so far 
aa I know, any dialectic materialist, seems adequately aware of 
*is divergence. Engels says that the discovery of a Iabaratory 
method of creating "the coloring matter in the roots of madder" 
proves that our idea (and our sense-perception) of this sub. 
stance have objective validity. Our idea in the laboratory is 
. that this substancc has no color at all, but i s  a mtrc collocation 
of atoms, electrons, and so forth. Our sense-perception, and 
oar idea in poetry and daily life, is that rhc substance is red. 
The question is which of these mental states has objective vaE 
iditg, and whether they both have, or perhaps, since they differ, 
neither of them. And that question Engels* experiments could 
never d v e ,  nor did Engels ever raise the question. Engtlr 
txprcssly s a p  that the whole question between materiaHsm and 
idtalism is as to whether "nature" is first and "spirit" second, 
ox wice vwsu-a question of abandoning religious mythology. A 
modern sceptic of the concept "matter," like Hdey or Karl 
Pcarson, has no illusions about "spirit" coming first, and is 
wholly beyond this question of religious mythology. 
Lenin is equally unaware of the problem as it stands in 
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minds untroubled by the fear of religion. He thinks that the 
whole dimasion began with Bishop Berkeley and is exhausted 
when the Bishop'e d d  God is removed, He too speaks rashly 
of the color red. 
"We ask," he says, "whether or not objective reality is 
mumed as given ua, when we see red. . . . If one holds that it 
L not given, then he is relapsing . . . into subjectivism and 
aguosticisrn. . . . If one holds that it is given, then a certain 
phiosophic doctrine necessarily follows. Such a doctrine has 
long since been worked out, namely, materialism. Matter is a 
philosophic category which refers to the objective reality given 
to man in his sensations, a reality which is copied, photographed, 
reftcctcd by our sensations, but which exists independently of 
them."* 
On another pagc-concerned merely to prove the existence 
of an objective world-he says :- 
"If coIour is a sensation dependent upon the retina (as natu- 
ral science compels you to admit) then the light rays falling on 
the retina produce the sensation of colour. That means that 
independent of us and our consciousness there exist vibrations 
of matter, or ether waves of a certain length and certain velocity 
which, acting upon the retina, produce in us the sensation of one 
colour or another. That is how naturaI science regards it. 
The various sensations of one colour or another are explained 
by science in terms of various Iengtha of light waves existing 
outside of the human retina and independently of man. Such 
is the view of materialism. . . . "** 
Is the coIor red a "copy," "image," "photograph" of "ether 
waves of a certain length and a certain velocity"? 
Of course it is not. And it is exactly this divergence of 
conceptual knowledge of the world from sense-perception of ir 
which originally raised the problem h i n  pretends to be at- 
tempting to solve, and which continues to raise it Iong after 
Bishop Berkeley's God has gone to rest. Lenin is not attempting 
tb solve this problem, nor even to answer the arguments of 
those who proposed to sohc it in the manner of Mach. If he 
Mafwklirnr A d  Empirio-Cri i ih ,  Coil:ct#d Works English tranmtatiw) VoL 
.13, p 101-2. 
H IbM,, p. 34. 
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were, he c d d  not po4bIy makc that crude blunder. 
w l e  truth is that Ltnin's work, so far as concerns Md, is 
no philosophic argument a t  all, but a tirade against rr sciatifi~ 
mind occupied with a genuine problem which Lenin, still linger- 
ing in the convalescence from metaphysical idealism, m o t  
wen see. It is fantastic to regard Lcnin's book ar a contribution 
to the questions raised by the steadily increasing divergence b ~ -  
tween science and the Iife of the s c n s e ~ s o l v e d  questions all. 
It is stdl more fantastic to go back and ascribe to Marx h d f  
in ~845-for the mere reason that he wanted to bring Htgcl'a 
emphasis upon action into a world cortceivtd in terms of scns- 
a complete grasp of the whole problem, and a modern American 
dution in which the mind is conceived, in a complttely post-Dar- 
winirn manner, as an instrument of "adjustment" to the "en- 
~ironment." Especially so when, as wt have seen, what Marx 
actually said was that the enwirontnent itself, the "object," "real- 
ity,'' "the world revealed to the externaI senses" ( I  quote PI&- 
hanov's translation of Sinnlichkcir) is to be conccivcd "subjeo 
tively" and as "practical human action." 
Feuerbach has got far enough, Marx said in effect, to see 
that sensation or the object of sense is the real thing and the 
idea or thought-object derived, but he has not yet arrived at 
the corresponding view that practical action is the real thing 
and theoreticai reasoning derived. Feuerbach has not yet got 
right down into the real world where those "objects of sense" 
are in a state of "practical human-sensible aaionW-and that 
means action directed toward ends having value-in short, t* 
ward the social revolution. Until you put this practical action / right out into the red world by calling it the essence of sensation 
and the senseobject, you will never get beyond the contemplation 
of separate individuals and bourgeois society, for that ia all 1 there in  in the cxi~ring world to contemplate. In other words: / If you do not read your purpose to change the world into the 
world itself, you cannot be at the same time realistic and pur- 
posive. You cannot be a "materialist" and strive toward an 
' ideal unless you conceive matter itself as striving toward your 
ideal. 
It was because he had thus succeeded in conceiving tbc 
real world and the knowing mind i s  cooperating in a practical 
14 THE MST STAND OF DIALECTIC MATERIALISM 
&ctivity, that M a n  could declare the highest wisdom to b t  
" 'the revolutionary', practical~ritical action.'' I t  is because he 
had succeeded in fusing the object and the true perception of it 
into st single act, a process toward a goal, that he was able to  
idcntify theoretical and practical knowledge, science of history 
d t h  program of action toward communism, and find the end 
of all philosophy, the triumphant swan-song of every supreme 
dart to understand the world, in the very act of changing it 
for the better, because thar act of practical change i s  what the 
red world is. That is what Marx meant, and that is what his 
words say, in the Theses On Feuerbach. 
For HegeI's mttaphysic of Reality or the "absolute being" 
as Idea, with its conservative political implication, Feuerbach 
substituted a metaphysic of the absolute being as "passion," with 
evangtlical or "true" socialism as its political implication. And 
for Feuerbach's metaphysic of passion, Marx substituted a 
metaphysic of purposive action as the essential Reality, with 
political implications which Itd to the Russian revolution. All 
three systems are metaphysical and literally animistic, each 
stres8ing one of the three attributes of mind-thought, feol- 
ing and, in the essence of the thing, will-in its account of what 
is ultimately "real". That is the story told by these theses. And 
they all three, notwithstanding the scientific fruitfulness of 
Marx's thought, stand wholly aside from the progress of science. 
Abandon the improbable assumption that Marx invented 
fifteen years before the publication of The Origin Of Species a 
view of the mind quite obviousIy attributable to the "influence 
of Damin," and the further improbable assumption that having 
invented this world-startling idea he never took the trouble to 
develop it or even to write it down intelligibly, and the further 
improbable assumption that besides not writing it down, he 
never explained it to his dose intellectual friend, who shared 
aII his labors, and the further improbable assumption that when 
this friend read over to him an official exposition of their com- 
mon views containing crass statements to the contrary, he ncver 
bothered to offer a correction, and the further improbable as- 
sumption that he himself in a preface to his maturest work made 
a statement to the contrary, and the further improbable assump 
I tnm that minds of the calibre of Rosa k b o u r g ,  Fmaz Mehring, PItkhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, have throughout their lifetimes believed in and developed the Marxian philosophy In total ignorance of what its main point is, and the further im- probable assumption that in the year of our Lord, 1929, a papa of John Dewey suddenly found out that this main point is mira- culously identical with the main point in john Dewey's in~tru- 
mental theory of knowledpabandon all thest fantastic rs- 
i sumptionr, and sit down soberly and examine what M a n  actually 
said in his Theses On Fcwsrbah, you h d  that he said nothing 
whatwer offering the slightest ground for this myth. There is 
no "deviation" of Engels and there is no supernatural dair- 
wyance of Man. There is merely Sidney Hook tallring about 
what people say without paying attention to their actual words, 
1 A trace of the mental process by which Hook built up this myth of the dairvoyancc of Karl Marx is to be found in his / earliest translation of the first Thesis on Frucrbdrh. Here, by 
, inserting the word something and by changing an adverb to m 
adjective, he made Marx say that reality shodd be conceived, 
' not "~~bje~tively," but objectively. The translation reads as 
follows :- 
"The chief defect of all previous mrtcrialism . . . is that 
the thing-the rea l i ty -percept ib i l i~as  been conceived of 
only under the form of the object or of direct apprehension; 
not as sensible human activity, Praxis, something nor subjective."* 
By reading "something not subjectivc" instead of "not sub- 
jectively," Hook made Marx say the exact opposite of what he 
actually said. A strange way to prove that aU other Matian5 
have "deviated" from the thought of Marxl Hook has now, 
in his recent book, corrected this error in translation, but he has 
in no wise altered the inferences which rested upon it. I should 
Eke to ask by what process of reasoning Hook managed to 
attribute to Man the same philosophy and theory of knowledge, 
no matter whether he said reality should be conceived "rubjecd 
tive1y" or as "something not subjective." 
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WHAT MARX BROUGHT FROM HEGEL 
Hook's casuistry, of course, has no ignoble motive. A 
state of Talmudistic infatuation with the mind of Karl Marx 
is common enough, and also natural enough, in these days when 
tveotr have given Marx an indubitable place among the biggest 
men of history. It is nevtrtheless disastrous to the further 
progress of revolutionary science-and moreover extremely uun- 
Mantian. 
It should be po~dble, without loss of admiration for Marx's 
genius, to sec the retrograde significance of these Theses. 
After rejecting Hegel with extreme scorn in favor of Feuerbach, 
who "placed philosophy in the negation of philosophy,"* and 
then after rejecting Feuerbach, too, and emphatically announc- 
ing that he did not want even that much philosophy, but was 
going straight down into thc real world of muItiplc material 
facts and write empirical science, Marx felt lost.** He felt 
lost because of his passionate revolutionary idealism, and be- 
cause, being a German philosopher, he did not know what to 
do with it, He did not how where it should find a place to 
exist, after those Britishers and Frenchmen--and even Feuer- 
bach with certain sentimenta1 compensations-had excluded it 
from their conception of the objective world. He felt lost, and 
he went back to Hegtl--not in order to get the "active side," 
the "dynamic principle,"*** not in order to convince himself 
that the world is moving and changing. Everybody knew that; 
the French rationalists were IiteralIy drunk with the idea of 
progress; Comtt had already founded sociology as an evolu- 
tionary science. He went back to Hegel to get some method of 
reading the change he wanted, and Iris own action-practical 
action in a revolutionary directioa-into the very stuff of this 
H X h i d  pcrbap ny, q f  he had mwcdcd In rejeaiag &mi, he roo& haw 
f e I c ~ " h f m ~ p ~ t o ~ t h e L ~ ~ d b i r m i d  1 
I Is anything in mentaI history more clear? 
- - . . 
- ? - 
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new material world that Be found so real and so crriting. r'=And of course the method was ~trictly H+lian. I do not .' --: j ! I 
1 bow how Sidncy Hook, who appears to  b. on terms of indmtc 
. i 
I 
understanding with Hegd, can fail to realize how natnrd it was, 
and h ~ w  inevitable, that Marx-a fervent Htgelim up to the 
a p  of twenty- f i~hould ,  in jotting down some thmghta upon 
E'cutrbach, follow him in his casual identification of "waeibilitp"' 
or the act of sense-perception with the reality of the material 
world. For in Hegel's view-if X may push my more shlbbom 
understanding this far--that identification was of the essence 
of the tale. The world was not matcrirl, but mental, and the 
very process af the arising of sense-perception was to be ex- 
plained as a gradual coming back to itself of this mcntajntss 
after its "alienation" in matter. Hegel says in so many words, 
; speaking of the "process of perceiving" and the "object ptr- 
ceived" :-"The object is in its essential nature the same as 
the process."* And he shows bow sophistical and inadequate 
this process is when it is relied on to give us knowledge of the 
pure and essential entities, which art the "objects of thought." 
Upon this very ground he derides the pretensions of "sound. 
common sense," which he identifies with perceptual understand- 
ing. What could be more natural and absolutely inevitable 
than that Mam and Feuerbach, returning to "sound common 
sense" after their alienation in the philosophy of Hegd, should, 
off-hand, identify the real material objects in a commonsense 
world with "sensibility," or the process by which minds come 
in touch with them? 
Let us quote once more that revealing conversation+ 
"Truth, reality, sensibility," said Ftuerbacb, "are idtnti- 
cal. . . . Only sensibi1ity is truth and reality. Where there is 
no sense, then is no being, no real object.'' 
Quite true, replied Marx, but this "object, reality, sensi- 
bility" must be "conceived subjectively." It must be conceived, i juet as Hegtl used to conceive the ideal object, as "practical activity,'' as action toward something hightr. Else what is to become of thc revolution ? 
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"A-is+ wittrout passion is a being without being," said 
Fcucrbach. 
h the contrary, said Marx, "reality" must be "conceived 
a8 . . . dm.'' 
Hwk tdls us that Marx, "as a dose student of Hegel's 
Pkkommologk des GGisrcs . . . considered the chief contribu- 
tion of Gcrman classical philosophy as opposed to metaphysical 
m a t e r i r l i  to be its emphasis on the activity of mind."* hle 
for* that thia so active mind was not only mind, but also the 
8 u b s t ~ c t  of the world, and its activity on a world scale was 
congtaial to the philosaphtr. I n  that c o a g e ~ i d  acfiwity of the 
world cmceiwd as m i ~ d  lay the essence of Hcgel's philosophy, 
approadd from the standpoint of his own interest, and of our 
hkmt, in it-approachtd from the standpoint of a scientific 
or merely, sensible understanding of what such philosophies are. 
And it was that congenial activity of the world--not our modern 
Beast of the activity of mind irr and upon the world-that Marx 
br~u&t from Hegel and embedded in those celebrated Theses 
On Fcwrbrrch, where mind and the world together arc nothing 
but pradcal action in a revolutionary direction. The Theses 
arc ju* celebrated. They ought to be singled out by all his- 
tori- of the nineteenth century and marked with a p;rtat sign- 
po& reading: 
DETOUR I 
At this point the gcience of social revotution, given a fair 
start by the French enlightenment, makes a one hundred year 
detour through German philosophy. It will be back in 1945, 
enriched by r vast knowledge and a true method of procedure 
and successful experiments on a large scale, at a more developed 
scientific point-of-view. 
IV 
ANOMISSFON, A SUBSTITUTION AND A FAIRY TALE 
That a man of Marx's hard and penetrating mind ahodd 
rest content with such a poor stab at a philosophy as this-a 
T b  aym~rbar, July, 1931. 
- 
' in which the real object is conceived s'tlbjd-,, ,a 
materialism in which matter fulfills the e ~ m t i d  MOO, bf 
ap ir iwan  be understood ody when you remember that Mar* 
never dwelt on or developed his philosophy at all. And that 
a n  be understood only when you realize that his central wi& 
and purpose at the moment of writing those fragments which 
=&in it, was to get rid of "philosophy" Jtogtthtr. Thil 
identification-"hastily scribbled downM--of sensation with ma- 
terial reality, and the two of them with practical human action, 
enabled h h  to combine his revolutions ry will with his conceptiw 
ef the mrld, and that once accomplished, ht fled from the scene 
*ere he had "planted the genial seed of the new philosophy," 
and never took a stroll in that direction again throughout his 
life.* 
Thew facts abo, however, are forgotten, or unconscio- 
&led over, by Sidney Hook He tells us that Die Deutsthe 
Ideologic, a manuscript completed in the same year in which 
M a n  scribbled down those theses, is "the most important single 
source of the study of Marx's ph*dmophy."** And yet he 
leaves his readers ignorant of the fact that this untrmslated and 
rrther inaccessible manuscript contains r wholesale repudiation 
of philosophy, a repudiation of the very idea that there can be 
such a thing as philosophy, repeated t h e  and again. 1 could 
quote a wlid page of such statements r a  the folIowing: 
'We recognize only me single science, tbe scicna of btorg .  
You can view it from two rid+ and divide it into the hiat~rg of 
nature and the history of people . . . " 
" . . . When you begin b describe reaIity, then m khpmdcnt 
phiIasophy Iosa its mistenct-medium. In its place mrry be foud, at 
the most, a summary of the g t n d  resulw abstracted from pn in- 
vestigation of the hiaaorical development of man . . . . ,I 
i 'We fully realize that Feucrbaeh . . . wmt as far an a t h & r  could go without simply ceasing to be a theorher and a ghiE ampher. . . . " 
"Feuerbach's mistake lies in the fact that he d d  not a p p d  
the world of ~nmtian without thc -which ia to say, the ege- 
*f the philosopher. . . . " 
I 
"And by the way, with this dew of things, which taka them 
1 -la utata thu in L d d g  F c y c ~ k c k  
1 JovnrrJ rf P h i l w ~ f i f ,  YoL 2s N& 5, p. 117. L 
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as they are in d t y ,  dI dcepdhking ph;rompbical problcms reduce 
tbmdva to some simple question of cmpirid fact. . . . " 
"For a practical mntuj&et, that is  for e communist, the thing 
M & nwrlutionk the &ring world-that is, p d c a l I y  turn against 
tbhp ss be finds them, and change them" 
This book was delivered to the publisher in 1845-1846, 
and in 1845 Mnnr penned those famous Theses On Feuerbach, 
conchding with this aphorism: 
"Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; 
the thing is to change it." 
It is dear when the two texts arc juxtaposed that Man's 
essential wish at that time, an tssential part of his meaning, 
therefore, in the apothegm, was: Quir philosophizing and we 
your brains in r scienri$c efort to change the world. But bc- 
cause he had not reaUy made the escape from Hcgelian animism 
-&cause he did not "mean what we do" by the word scientific 
4 e  apothegm remains equivarl. It is a good symbol of his 
equivocal position, the position of a man who plants the seed 
of a new philolsophy on the very day he st& out to root up all 
philosophy. 
Instead of presenting this puzzling state of afairs as it was, 
Hook keeps under the tabIe Mam'a explicit but untranslated 
repudiation of phiIosophy, and blandly reports that Marx, in 
a perfectly Dewey-like manner, declared that phiiosophy was 
henceforth to be "an instrument in changing the world,"* "an ' 
instrument of social liberation." * * 
Besides thus shding away Marx's actual feelings about 
phdosophy at the time when he wrote this thesis and throughout 
his life thereafter, Hook keeps shuffling into view, without a 
date, previous statements in praise of pbilosoph y-youth ful 
statements going way back to thc period when Marx was still 1 
a Hcgelian. "Of philosophy in general," Hook admonishes us, I 
who art merely trying to carry out M a d s  wish to make the 
revolutionary movement scientific, "it is well to remember Marx's 1 
own caution that 'the ford that levera1 individuaIs cannot stom- i 
ach modern philosophy and die of philosophical indigestion I 
proves no more against philosophy than the fact that here and 
J d  af Philosopiy, VoL 25, Na 5, p, 129. 
aa Pam Heed Ta Mum, TAr M d r m  Q s s r h I y ,  Vol. 6, Ha 1, p 53. I 
. . .  
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tc a boiler ~ l o d c s  and bIom several pas-~g in@ 
against mechanics'." It b needas to eolp that 
erwheImed by thh quotation when we remembtr 
published in the summcr of x 84%-four years bcforc 
very from Hegel had born its fruit in that wholcsak desrrm. . 
on of philosophy which lies at the basb of, and can a l e  
.: ain, his intelIectua1 life.* 
Besides keeping out of sight this unqualified denunciation of . 
phvharacteristic not only of Ma=, but of the whoh 
rn wkch he developed, the age of Comtt, Feuerbach, 
amilton and MiII, Sidney Hook invests a veritable f d ~ t 8 h  
accollnt for a well known later statement of Engels to the 
"As soon," said Engels, "as each spcad science clarities 
&a p i t i o n  in relation to the. toialitg of things and our howl- +, then any speciaI science of this totality beoomcs super0uou~. 
The only discipline that s u ~ v e s  of the whole of traditional 
phhwphy is the sdmct of thinkiag and its la-formal logic 
end dialectic. Everything else is absorbed in the positive sciences 
of nature and history." 
To get this out of his way, Hook iavmts the story that 
'Engels is here s p e w  of o "future day" when social libcraticm 
.&all have been accomplished, and in r c ladas  society "dl 
philosophy is transformed into science." ''Speaking of that 
1 9  
'. ,future day, Engels writes . . . hc sap, and then quota the 
jsbove passage. A sheer act of fancyi It is dear in 
'mvn words that be is not talking about any fume day. 2; 
; 'dmply repeating the oId opinion expressed eight times h Die 
' ,&~tschc Idtologic--"most important source for the ~tudy of 
[ Marx'~ phiiosophy"-that from the standpoint adopted by 
Mam and Engels philosophy is supt~uous. Repeating the atme 
&ng in his Ludwig Fesrtrbach, Engels says explicitly that '%the 
warxian understanding of history . . . makes an end of p H +  
wphy in the realm of history, just as the dialect undmtrtnding 
+ h a  Riasawv, the R w s h  who d o m a d  and dcoiphmd Die DwtscRc f&kb&, 
a atrlfidmtly orthodo* *xponeot of the soviet a t e  p b p h y ,  b , ' 'd tb 
ra~urk that tbi early repudiation of pbilos~ph~ k tbt ow iaaporca~X t c *eWn 
m&incd ia it. 
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of nature render8 every philosophy of nature useless or impob 
sible." 
It is obvious, however, from Hook's own definition of phil- 
osophy, as he puts it in the mouth of Marx, that no "future 
b y , "  no "social liberation" would ever make it superfluous. 
Pbilowphy srccordig to  Mam, he tells us, is "a sociology of 
vrluea, investigating the social roots and conditions of what 
human beings desire . . . a criticism of standpoints and lncthads 
in the light of conditions under which they emerge and the pur- 
poses which they serve. . . . It is . . . passion or will conscious 
of itself."* 
Arc we to have no sociology in the classless society-r 
no values? Is will never again to be conscious of itself? 
Hook contradicts himself continually because he is trying 
to be a child of two fathers. Philosophy here is ''an instrument 
of soda1 liberation" because it is particularized thought, thought 
brought specifically to bear on social and moral problems--and 
that is straight from Dewey. Elsewhere-remembering Marx- 
it is "philosophy as generalized thought" that "becomes an in- 
strument in changing the world."** 
MATERIALISM THROWN OVERBOARD 
After throwing out of dialectic materidism the copy theory 
of knowledge and the belief that philosophy is superfIuour, 
Hook proceeds to heave over practically everything else except 
the n a m ~ n d  that, as we saw, he has forty ways of amending. 
Indeed, tbe next thing to go by the board carries a good half 
of the name with it--namely, materialism. The word has meant 
throughout history a doctrine of the fundamental stuff the world 
is made of. T o  this doctrine Marx adhered without reservation 
before he went back to Hegel for the dialectic. In going back, 
he criticised materialism for neglecting the "active side," and 
Tkr M o d m  QwIII#, VoL 6, Na 1, p. Sf. 
H 3 d  of P M m ~ f i y ,  VOL 25, No. 5, p. 123. 
hewmtbarkto the idedht t3  m*. A 
ticised materialirrm in any other -. l3 . . 
Marx did not believe that matter b tht.c#untiJ 
~ u r e t y t h c W w i 8 0 n b i n t w t o ~  
materialism. H e  &m& -, 
r, that "dialectic materi-t least in ib f d e  
not believe in a monism of stuff, but cmphsraizes a m+ 
."' A stammer here in the shift from b e l i ~ e  to. mpb 
progress of science invalidate 
aphysical position of mattridism." 
c fact is that Marx believed, as Lenin did, that "the world 
" but ht read into this matter 
in the world as an ordered 
erely repbed to Herr Dihhg'r attack on it. 
; he merely replied to 
in d v e d  them in the 
ccaust if that happened, the element of 
ributian of human valuation and logical 
e procedure to a "material*' world-would come clear. 
come dear in the mind of the pmon writing it, and be 
realize that he is abandoning empirical science, which ir 
that Man desired and that all loyal rwohtion~ry 
to and keep up with, 
sophits have devoutly wished to escape 
ort and get cowlatiom, and have brought forth 
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their tricky dr piori conception as a quite candid lure to 
the 'kill to believe." Dialectic materialism, wishing to be un- 
consoled srnd practicaI-scientific but not knowing how, hides in- 
stinctively its animistic element, and the best way to hide $ i 
P wientific world is not to write it clearly down. C~~~ 
Nevertheless, it was clearly and naively written down twice. 
Once when Engets said that, "The celestial bodies, like the for- 
mations of the organisms by which they are under favorable 
conditions inhabited, arise and perish and the courses that they 
run . . . take on eternally *tore magnificent dimensions"; and 
once when Manr spoke of "the higher life-form toward which 
the existing society strives irresistibly by its own economic 
dcvtlopment" and declared on that basis thar the working dass 
1 b has no ideal to realize, it has only to set free the elements of 
the new society."* 
HISTORIC DETERMINISM ABANDONED 
Tht next thing to go by the board in Sidney Hook's effort 
to keep dialectic materialism afloat in the waters of science is 
historic determinism. Again we may ask why Manr and Engcb, ' 
if they did not believe in a thing, adopted thc name by which 
it is universally known. We ask in vain. The thing must go 
overboard because it belongs to Hegel's anthropomorphic meta- 
physics and will not square with the modern concrete study of ' 
bistoric events or the modern science of mind. Hook himself 
conccdcs in one of his rare moments of candid inquiry that the 
Marxian conception of "all history" coxltains an anthropomor- 
phic elenieat, and that Marx confuses condition with cause.** 
He refaaes to see the reason for this-namely, thar Marx has 
read his purpose into "all history" just as Hegel did, and i f  
he is to cling to his purpose, then he must declare its fulfillment I 
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neetissaryIIy There is no 
in this philosophy is nothing 
eftort Marx desiied to m 
n with cause is a mere c o r d  
e with nbc8ssury, wbich is the 
rphic view. All the argument abou 
frcawilI or necessity, fatalism or dtttrmini~,  r a t i d .  
h n t a r i m ,  efficacy of thought or that thought is an a& 
orncnon-all is mere chatter in the dark, never to c- 
the ~imple fact is recognized that Mam was a man of I 
and having read his purpose into history, he bad t~ . 
tory carry it through. 
a F  believed in the efficacy of human action, but he a b  
k v e d  in enough determinism to bring his pIan for the organ- 
btion of the working drss revolution, the dictatorship of the 
@~lttariat, and the resulting communist society, into his account 
# the necessary course of the historic process. Trotsky believer 
h it to the same extent and for the same reason, as is shorn 
in his recent assertion that "The victory of tbe Left Opposition 
is historically guaranteed." Ltnin believed in it to the aamt 
extent and for the same reason, as may be scea in this earliest 
declaration of his belief: 
"The idea of historic necessity does not in the bast under- 
mine the role of personalities in history; history is all c o m p d  
sf the activities of pemns, who arc indubitable p t a ,  The 
red question arising in an appraisal of the a d a l  activities of 
pcmm is: In what conditions are these actions p a m t e c d  
auccesa ? Wherc Is the guarantee that this adon will not remain 
a solitary deed drowned in a sea of contrary activities T'* 
All Lcnin needed to believe in order that his own pemonsrlitp 
sshould function as it did, was that success is pessible. Ht did 
not need to believe that it is g~arauteed. Such guarantees be- 
long to religion and not experimental science. But k i n ,  like 
,km, had an immature mceptim of what it is to be scientific, 
and for that reason only-for he was the last man in the world 
to  embark on a "quest for certainty"4e formdated his atti- 
tude at reflective moments in this language of the historic or 
:dialectic asc~ssity of the commrrnist regime. 
Wllr dr4 Tb Prim& Of The Pmpht (1895). 
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'I'hat Mam formulated bis attitude in the same way is 
notorious. It is needless to pile up quotations. The Communist 
Manifesto asserts that the fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory 
of the proletariat are "equally inevitable." In r 882, intro- 
ducing the first Russian Edition, Marx and EngeIs described the 
Manifesto itself as "a proclamation wherein the inevitable dis- 
apptsrana of present-day bourgeois property relations was 
heralded." Marx declared in his celebrated letter to Weide- 
mqer that his whole original contribution had been to  prwc 
that the cIasa struggle "leads necessarily to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat" and that to the society of the free and equal. 
In the face of these and many other explicit statements, and 
with the startling fact that Marx believed in the "iron necessity 
of socialism"* re-echoing throughout all revolutionary litttaturc 
shcc The Copnmsrnist Manifesto, Hook puts on a scholarly 
face and calmly informs us that, although "Mam soft-pedals 
on some occasions the voluntaristic aspect of his nascent instru- 
mentalism" and "despite some unhappy phrases of Engels," 
neither he nor Mam believed in a "univocal causal determina- 
tion of matter or things in history"** (which is indeed true), 
and that his followers have translated his "reIiance on 'processes 
at  work in the order of things' " into the "mythical Ianguage of 
the 'inwitability' of the development from capitalism to so- 
cialiam,"*** 8 
"Assuming a definite direction and rate in the productive 
relations of the social order and the relative constancy of certain 
human behavior patterns, Marx predicted that the social rewlu- 
tion would take place. Not inevitably, of course. . . . "**** 
To one acquainted with Marx the statement is so bold and 
bore-faced as to evoke a kind of smpifitd admiration, and when 
one reads in an article by the same author, pub1ished only 
twcIve months before: "Against t h i ~  it might be urged that 
Mam believed rocidism to bt inevitrble in the nature of things, 
md that it would realize itself by some sort of dialectic neces- 
thing like that is the s u b s m a  nad dg 
+"** What a pitiable Karl Msrrt, what a paor fitfd 
Gemam*** ind&t- 
he iron r~ecessi?y of a u ~ d  
all, but was just indicating 
.+miw tcndcncies that might or might not arrive at the result be 
.qo parsionately desired i 
"Anyone who has read carcfullg . . . " aaya Sidney Hook. 
'ht Marr himself found one careful reader of his book, C#d, 
M c a d  that he selected him for a tribute in tbc second editipn, 
, md here is what M a d s  o m  careful reader says in the  new 
prtf ace where Mam immortalized him : 
out one thing: t~ show, by 
tion, the necessity of mmsri~t  deter- 
conditions, and to establish, as imprr- 
tidy as pomible, the facts that m e  him far fundamental 
stwthg-points. For th is  it is quite enough, if he provcs, at rhe 
. ,same tinit, both tbe ntcessitg of the preacnt order of things, and 
the necessity of another order into which the first mugt intpit,ably 
pass over; and this aII &a aarnt, whether men believe or do 
qot believe it, whether thq are GQ~&QW or UI~COU&OUS of it. 
Ma= treats the social movement as' a p-s of mtural history, 
- 'governed by Iaws not only independent of human wiit, condous- 
X h d l h - I ~ ,  V d %  Na%p S9L 
~ T k r M k ~ , V o l I , N a 4 , p . ~  
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nea and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining 
that will, consciousnetus and intelligcnm" 
Upon this and further statements from a reader chosen by 
himaelf for commendation, Marx merely remarks : "What else 
is he describing but the dialectic method?'' 
Doa it not begin to be clear that Hook is not inquiring 
into and expounding Marx's philosophy, but trying to hold it up 
among modern scientific ideas and assumptions 3 Marx did not 
have the instrumental conception of knowledge invented by 
Dewey, nor did anybody, nor could anybody, have had it before 
Darmrin. What service is performed, and toward what end, by 
loading all this additional cant and confusion into a philosophy 
that Map never gave any steady thought to, and never wanted 
to produce in the first place? One can pardon a great man-of- 
action like Trotsky, whose own iron determination has been so 
long projected into the laws of history that he mistakenly fears 
to displace it lest it be lost, whose knowledge and passion are 
so fused togcthcr as to be perhaps at his age inseparable. But 
we see none of this iron determination or passion in Sidney 
Hook. He mnts two spiritual fathers where one is too many. 
He wants above all things to be a philosopher. For philosophy's 
sake-not for the revolution, not for the truth-he is bent on 
reinterpreting dialectic materialism at any cost, to prevent 
Marx's thought from becoming scientific. 
DAS KAPITAL BECOMES AN "ILLUSTRATION" 
That Hook has no deeper aim than to preserve the philo- 
sophic attitude as such, is shown by his next major operation, 
which is to throw out all of Manc's scientific conclusions as mere 
"illustrations of a method." He concedes to those who have 
attacked Man's doctrines as contradictory that "if they are 
mnsidcred in independence of the method they illustrate and 
the historical context in which they arose, they do appear con- 
a method of revolutionary criticism" 
1.. "The method, to be sure," he adds, "is to be c h d d  up 
light of his conrluiom but the lattcr are derivative* not 
. . . They are tentative and contingcn~'' 
to Mr. Hook it must be cxplsriacd here zhgt the 
ss atruggk is not, according to him, an "illustm 
rx'a other wnclusions, but is bound up in the 
thod itself. Indeed, it is the essential meaning and pupme 
this d t a t i o n  of method over rcswlts to protect the c lw 
c in economics md declare it ridt. The method is 
titicism demands a atandpoinb a 
the standpoint of the &se 
mope. His pmition impfi~d 
bconomiut at basis always is a dam economics. 
icit d u e  judgment becomes one of the orbsdm in 
which its analytic equations are written." 
ask here : If both kin& 
do you h o w  which w 
dialectic philomphy step 
cs is right because it is data- 
srn economics and Marx has alreadp 
on of the universe and of "alI history" 
. &h very pIan of procedure. As Sidney Hook says in his M e t e  
physics Of Pr~~grn~criswr, "A 'pure' method which does not in- 
1 w1I'~e reference to a theory of uristcnce is devoid of me- 
Marx's method is not a pure method but a diaItctic method, 
. and it is valid only in so far a8 existence itself, or at least a m i d  
dstence, is dialect i4s  engaged, that is, in a procedure by 
m a l e  and its resoIution, "from the lower to the higher," or 
ther words, in the direction in which the M a d a n  wiahes to 
's condusim, therefore, in the name 
he xashIp betrays himseIf with that 
in tbb acaioa are dl h tbn article la T h  Sym#erim, JalJ, 
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word "illustration"4idney Hook is only insisting that hfarxism 
abandon t8c competition with science and rest its case absolutely 
upon its e-ce aar o philosophy, a class-biased theory of ex- 
iattnce. I 
His loading off upon poor Engels the sin of L'deviatiag'y 
from this position is, however, entirely fantastic, Nobody en- 
gaged either in scientific research or in practical effort ever 
remained loyal to an animistic philosophy, or ever could. It is 
not class economia, for example, to say that goods are ex- 
changed; it is a fact. It is a fact that money passes from hand 
to hand. Both these facts are inherent parts of the theory of 
Dm K + t d  If these parts are objective truth verifiable by aU, 
where do the parts begin which are merely revolutionary criti- 
cism, valid only for "the proletariat of Western Europe"? Tht 
mere fact that this question can be asked and an answer imag- 
ined, show8 the folly of pretending that serious research can 
be engaged in without the assumption of a truth which, whether 
interesting or not, is at lenrt valid for everybody. 
 hat practical cffort requires such an assumption, and 
requites such truth, is stiU more obvious. "The purpose of 
Mnrx's intellectual activity," says Sidney Hook, "was the over- 
throw of the existing order." Well, you couldn't overthrow a 
fence-post, could you ?--could you turn over a fried egg neatly 
and properrJ?-+&out knowing something, and something not 
"tentative and contingent," either, but central and sure and rc- 
liable, something verified in the manner of the "hypothetical- 
deductive system," something without value judgments implicit 
in its abscia~z, if I may pretend to understand what that means, 
-something, in short, that the man who was trying to stop 
ym would h n t  to know too? It is the nced to eliminate the 
alternative, to make sure of the victory of your tfort--a need 
dictated, remember, by the nature of animistic thinking, not by 
the nature of revolutionary men-that gives rise to this whole 
prodigious effort to keep up the bluff that Mantian economics 
in rso far as it is  any good is not straight science. 
Enget could no morc keep up the blufi than Marx could, 
and Engtls had to finish tbt book-that is the extent of his 
deviation. And Sidney Hook can no morc keep it up than Engels 
could In the verp article in which he informa us that all Marx'u I 
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mere 3uottatim of a method, a d  rPot b b'Wh 
ddedudve coudmaiona like in $cnma&hb6 a 
ndimental charactt~of the culture mmpltx ia de= 
the mode of economic produdon prevalent at any 
ims: "All of M a d s  work was in the nature of 
hprpothesk . . , '' 
t &all we sav of a man who inform us at  the be& 
not hypothetical-deductive, and not valid q t  far the 
c context" in which they am-d in the condusim 
r getting forward with the work- but is trying to pre- 
mere ernrrticd attitude of the ~hiloso~hcr at mv cost 2 
&:of an essay &a< a11 of Marxts doctrina are ~ustra&c 
Be bamc essay inform us that ''all of Mads work was in 
Biattlre of evidence" for r hypotht~is ar to what is the deter- 
k g  factor in alC historic c a r t ~ t s ?  Can we sly a milder 
&than that he is not interested in clarifying the revolutionary 
b.' H.dhe  a mbre practical purpor~ he A d  acwr have 
wn that word "ilustration." For while it is true, from.* 
ct atandpoint of the dialectic philorophy, that & Marx7n 
usions ar t  but tcmwrarrr a~~licrrtions of his method. which 
You might ,think that having dumped everything else out 
dialectic materialism but the method, Hook's operation would 
comp1ete. Surely the method will be left standing as the 
t Mamians expounded it. But no! Here too there bas 
a crass deviation. Engels thought the dialectic movement 
to be found in material things, and that the method was 
fore applicable in physics and chemistry and biology. He 
the better part of tight years, in fact, applying it to the 
a1 sciences, or rather translating their findinp into the 
s of the dialectic. Lenin insisted that this world's "ordered 
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movement of matter in motion" is dialectic through and through, 
and held this to be the unconscious assumption of the "immcnse 
majority of natural scientists." h d  all Ruwian men of science 
dcsiroue to stand in with the government have acceded to this 
propo~itiun, and gone through some sort of verbal exercises in 
evidence of their political loyalty and orthodox faith. Hook, 
however, is not so naive in thest matters as Engels and Lcnin, 
and he ia not constrained by the Soviet government, and there- 
fore ht is perfectly aware that if you bothered a modern hard- 
working chemist or biologist or physicist with intrusions of this 
so-called "method of thinking," he would kick you out of his 
laboratory as a nuisance. 
Hook is also reckless enough to remember that Hegel orig- 
ixlaIly invented this idea of dialcctic logic to explain certain 
proceeding8 in which mind is involved--to explain, in fact, a 
worId fundamentally composed of mind and behaving as a mind 
behaves. He sees how crudely anthropomorphic it really was 
to call a materid world dialectic. Hegel's Ianguage, he re&Iessly 
reminds us, "reveals a continual implicit reference to conscious- 
ness and the activity of consciousness."* Moreover, it is of the 
essence of the dialectic philosophy-and this tvtn Hook will 
not f o r e g e t h a t  it belongs to the working class, and is in fact 
a method of criticism from the standpoint of the "class conscious 
proletariat of Western Europe.'' And Western Europe is too 
sophisticated to believe there is a bourgeois and a proletarian 
method in phyaics or chemistry. "To read the class struggle 
back into nature," says Hook, "is to imply that all nature is 
conscious-a proposition which only an Hegelian ideafist can 
accept."** 
Fox these good and sufficient reasons, having for similar 
reasons thrown out of dialectic materialism practically every- 
thing there was in it but the method, Hook proceeds to throw 
out the method in so far as it *plies to the material world. 
What we have to do, he tells us, is to dissociate this dialectic 
method from "illtgitimate attempts to extend it to natural 
phenomena in which human consaousness does not enter," * * * 
T h  -11, Vol, 6, Na S, p. as. 
Ibid, p. 67, 
- The S y m ~ m ,  Jub, 193t 
b t l f  never spoke of the 
d thought?***** ~C-U 
of barley s e d .  And Mam too muse have 
og to sleep, when &gda read 
haat waked up just in tiphc 
t 1 Great mff l Go ahead!" 
k e n  d e e p  or it- 
their philosophy dialectic mortarialiwa, 
is now, according to Sidney &oh a 
that the world is not uniformly ma- 
material it is not dialectic ! 
too, as cvcrpheert, Hmk.gets into mntrabction 
historic pairsibititits, but with biself. Ht hadl 
dedarcd that dialectic materialism d m  not believe in 
m of stuff" but st "monim of law," and has amded 
of "deviating" in prtmthg it as "a monistic sptem 
of a unified methd" He forgets all about that now, 
M e  beliema in i pld i s tn  of law, 
accuses Engels of "deviating" because he presented Mat. 
a "unified method"u1akilrg its dialectic apply, that in, 
hout nature as well as sctdety and the mind of msm. 
threw over the monism of s f d l  in favor of the monism 
The M&rn Qs&wIy, Pal. 5, Ha 4, p 431. 
d&lWbiug, & 144 
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of law, as we noted, in order to make dialectic materialism safe 
against science. He now throws over the monism of law for 
the sime reason4ecause the "distinctive character of the dia- 
lectic in Marx's theory of history lies in ciass-consciousness md 
sctios which breaks through polar oppositions . . . "* and pro- 
cceda by sudden leap8 and jumps. Natural scientists do nor find 
such a mode of action dominant in the physical world; therefore 
the dialectic must be withdrawn from that world. "There is 
no need to show that there are eudden leaps and jumps in 
nat&e to justify revolution in society," he say4--conccding9 by 
the way, that the real use of the dialectic in social science is to 
"justify rcvolution," not to achieve it--but at least still heroi- 
cally trying to save the face of this "method of thinking" when 
confronted by the faas and methads of modern science. 
N O T E  
Since I wrote the above passage, Sidney Hook has been 
attacked by the official communists for his assertion that the 
dialectic does not apply to physical nature, and has denied that 
he ever 'made such an assertion.** 
"If, by dialcctic," he says, "we mean the laws of motion, 
polarity and the transformation of quantity into quality--then 
dialectic is universal, appEts to nature as well as to man-and 
I have never denied it. But the distinctively Martcirm concep 
tion of dialectic is historical and sociaL" 
The communists accuse him here of "a sudden lapse of 
memory, to put the matter mildly," and they cat1 attention to his 
demand in the article in The Sympos iu~  that the dialectic be 
"disassociated from the illegitimate attempts to extend it to 
natural phenomena in which human consciousness does not 
enter." 
They might also have quoted his articIe, From Hegel to 
Me:*** 
"In Hcgel the dialectical process b expressed not only in 
Tht M o d m  Q ~ r r l ~ l r ,  Val. 6, No. 9, p 67. 
The Commrr~iri, VoL 12, Nor 1, 2 & 3. 
- Tht M a d h  Qw&, Vol. 6, No. 9, p. 63ff. 
and the same?, . . Only in virtue of the 
can Hegel write a iV#t~-pkifdsophb in 
They might aIso q ~ o a  from his rerim of my h k ,  Mar@ 
natances of d t j v e  &dopent and growth 
into the dialectic pattern, but it certainly tannot be 
en one has made these definite statements and been 
is certainly not adequate to reply: "If, by 
, we mean the Iaws of motion, eQ,, then &ale& a p p b  
re and I have never denied it." Tbt L an epuoor l  
, I hd, upon investigation, &at it is a 
The equivocation has been ,in Hook's atammB 
c and natute all along. Here ir what ha sap 
, From H e p i  TO Marx : 
ere are two  sense^ in which one may sptak of a natural 
commo~~plice. Change is obsed lc  
activity, and sudden quditatiw 
1 quantitative change: T h e  see  
ot, then, "a bpse of memorg, to put it mildly:' h t  
attempt ta str~~ddle the issue, whijl make8 Hook w 
p 4 9 ,  vet 4, PJaL 4, p. 3934 
Q M W C T ~ I  V d  6, Na 9, p H +  
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elasive an opponent upon this question. His position might be 
summed up by saying: "There is something rather dialectic 
a b u t  nature, but after aU nature is not very dialectic and the 
real thing is onIy to be found where consciousness plays a role." 
And this queer and vague and totally un-Marxian way of talk- 
ing, is an even better proof of what I am trying to prove, than 
his bare stattments that the dialectic docs not apply to physical 
nature. It is r proof that Hook is not trying to discover and 
expound the nature of the dialectic philosophy as Marx believed 
in it, but is trying to amend that philosophy to the extent ntcrs- 
sary to make it stand up in the face of modern viem of science. 
He is constrained whto confronted by the documents to admit 
that Marx believed physical nature to be dialectic, but he in 
tonstrained by the facts of modern science to deny that this 
notion has any place in the laboratory. His straddling or his 
"lapse of memory," whichever you decide to call it, is one more 
evidence of the nature of the task on which hc is engaged and 
I of its hopelessness. 
THE DIALECTIC REDEFINED 
No man seeking the truth about Marxism or about the 
world, or seeking to clarify minds for the good of the revolution, 
could tangle himself up in these self-contradictions. His motive 
would keep his mind dear. Sidney Hook is trying to win a case. 
He is defending the Mamian Talmud at the bar of modern 
science. 
For this purpose he has not only to withdraw the diulectk 
from the physical world, but he has to withdraw from the dia- 
Iectic a good deal of what made it interesting. The division of 
a developing totality into "triadic phases," he teh us, "is not 
logically essential to the method." In fact, this whole business 
of thesis, antithesis and resolution in a higher unity--always 
of more use to Christian priests than pagan scitntis-ay 
now go by the board. All we need is two "phasea" and a "s$e- 
A STUDY OF SIDNEY HOOKS R 
cific relation of opposition betwecn thoac ph- which ga&m 
. . 
a SUCCCSS~C)H of other phases," 
To be more exact: "The sufficient condition of a dialec- ' 
tical situation is given when these two phases present a relation 
of opposition and inscrsction such that the rcsdt ( I )  txpibi? 
something qualitatively new, ( 2 )  preserves some of thc stme 
tural elements of the interacting phases, and (3) eliminates 
others."* 
I It is obvious that these conditions are met whenever any- thing whatever grows or develops-all except one, and that iq 
that there must be an "opposition" between two "phases," and 
this opposition must "gtneratzte" other phases. In other word* 
since we have now limited the application of this method to 
social history, and since "alI hi~tory is a history of claswtrug- 
gles'?-this is merely s grandiose, abstract, non-empirical, and 
therefore fruitlessly philosophic, way of making the simple 
I remark that society progresses by the method of claswtmggi~. A few minor "totalities" can be singled out within society, to be sure, and shown to follow the same "lawy'-the g r d  of 
personality, for instance. But that is not really relevant or 
necessary. "The Marxian totality is social," and the relations 
within this totality as at present constituted ''take the form of 
opposition between proletariat and capitalist, the necesbiti~ of 
production and the need of consumption, and so forth. All of 
I these oppositions constitute a whole. . . . They cannot be s o l d  without changing the whole. At a certain point . , the em- brium is destroyed and reconstituted by human actiuls . . . the dialectic principIe appears as class activitg." And that is about all there is left of the dialectic principle. 
For Marx and Engeb, who really compelled themselva to 
believe that all nature advances by a process of contradiction 
and resolution, and that their program of class struggle t o ~ r d  
communism was but one instance of this universal law, there 
was some reason to dress up the progra-t least on holidays 
,and solemn occasion+in this remote, grandiose and abstract 
language. But when you have thrown the dialectic out of dl 
the rest of the world except human society, and practiemrUy re- 
stricted its application to the class struggle, what is the uee of 
- 7 
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t&&g to this highly general language any longer? Why say 
''t~t~lfity" when you mclln "sodsty"? Why say "phases" when 
you mean cfwsesf Why say that "the driving force in the dt- 
F. *dopent of a dialectical situation is derived from thc conflict 
I * and opposition of the elements within it," when you mean that 
c the capit&$s can only be exproprirrted by an orgaaiad t i a s s  
struggle? What is, in s t l  honesty, the actual gain made, when 
you have frankly limited your meaning to particular things, in 
continuing to use the language of univtrsal knowledge ? If, in 
osdtr to save the dialectic philosophy, Mr. Hook has been corn- I 
pclled to throw out, not only everything in it besides the dialectic, 
but a h  to throw out the u~iversafity of the dialectic, what is the 
whole operation for? Is it not the essence of phiIoaophy to 
derciibe the universa1 characters of being? And if his laws of 
dialectic apply genuinely only in human society, is it nor sociology 
rather than philosophy that he is regaling us with? I 
To anyone who really believes that philosophy ia, at large, I 
an attempt to describe the universal characters of being, the 
question is cogent, and it seems ahnost impossible to guess what 
Mr. Hook is about. Bat if we hold fast to thc derogatory con- 
ception of philosophy-not, of course, denying the possibility of 
an attempt to describe the universal characters of being--as 
an attempt to preserve the animistic attitude, the sense of co- 
operation between man and the objective world, by reading into 
the universal ideas and abstractions employed by science, a little 
of his own inttrast and his own wish, then the answer becomes 
very simple indeed. Scierlce has accomplished so much, and 
gained such a power over our minds, with its sovereign method 
of suspending the wish or interest during the definition of fact, 
that it is no longer possible, except in the sphere of sociology 
where it hati accomplished Uttk or nothing, to keep up the 
. pretense that wish and definition can wisely be confused. Only in 
this sphere can one still with any plausibility read the subjective 
purpose into the objective facts. Sidney Hook has ceased to im- 
pute the daswtruggle-towar~ommunism procedure to univer- 
s a l  being, because Re senses aU around him in this age of science 
the impossibility of makiig it stick. But he retaina the language 
of universal knowledge, because that will still hdp him in the 
sufficiently forlorn effort to make it ati&+therwisc than as a 
plan of procedure toward a sspcdfic en&in the sphere ~f;%@g' 
contemplattd by the soda1 adencts. 
". 
In x 928 Mr. Hook was still, it seems, in the ds&c p d b  a. 
of the philasopher. At least he w a ~  d d h g  philmofiy -I 
"generalized thought," and was not yct mnsciously mtrictbg , 
the application of the "dialectic" to the social and p@do@cd - 
fields. "The 'dialectict for Marx," he was saying, "is not soms 
thing working ~xclusiwely in things . . . but it is primsl~ilp in , 
things as rt condition precedent to human action."* It wm only 
in 193 2 that he proclaimed the "deviation" involved in imagining . 
that the didectic worka in things, and it was only then that he 
declared philosophy to be, for Ma=, not generalized thought 
at dI but highly particularized c r i t i c i d t i c i s m  confuted to 
the field of ethics, politim and sociology, and therein frrrnaEp 
anchored to its own "prmuppositiuns and bias," Philmophy he 
nbw dehca as a conscimsly class-biased "sodology of &tbl . 
investigating the soda1 roots and conditions of what human 
beings desire."** 
This shows a state of growth, even if not of "dialectics," 
in Mr. Hook himself, and suggests quite irresistibIy, that a few 
mare years will bring him out on the road of common sense and 
science. For when philosophy abandons the pretense to be x 
disinterested account of reality at large, and frankly admod- 
edges ita particular field and its particular bias, retaining ontp 
the name of philosophy and the language of thc universal &ate- 
gories, it has but a short life left. Science will not neglect to 
study in its cooler way the "social roots and conditions of what 
men desire." And however difficult in this field its dort to be 
disinterested, however often its name may become a screen for 
mere &ss propaganda, in the long m nevertheless men who 
wish to know f act-for whatever purpoewil l  seek them f m  
thoae who aspire to be diminterested, not from those who judfp 
a "frankly avowed . . . bias" by calling it philosophy and using 
general terms for particular tbings. 
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A PECULIARITY OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY 
There arc mo real obstacles, however, on Mr. Hook's 
road home to common sense. One is the indubitable fact that 
social science, in so far as it looks into the future, does differ 
radicaUy from the so-called natural sciences. It differs in that 
the scientist himself is a part of the process he is studying, and 
his own judgment, his very predictian, may affect the result. 
Where other scicnces strive by every artifice to "eliminate 
the personal equation," a study of social evolution--even though 
striving to be "pure" science and leaving others to apply its 
knowledge- ncmrtheless cannot eliminate the personal factor 
without falsifying the facts. And though this may seem a slight 
matter when the personality of any one scientist is concerned, 
it becomes a mighty factor when you realize that authorized 
science as such is concerned. Nobody will deny the important 
position occupied by science among the "social roots and condi- 
tions of what men desire," nor the momentous effect which 
systematic verified knowledge is going to have upon the fuhre 
of mankind. What the social scientist thinks, therefore, during 
the progress of a Iarge scale experiment may decide the result 
of the experiment. This makes the philosophic attitude, and 
most particularly the "dialectic method of dinking" peculiarly 
plausible here. For that so-called "method of thinking," as 
we have seen, is not a "method of tbig"+xcept merely 
as it emphasizes that all things are in a process of fluid change 
and warns against the danger of fixed concepteit  is a method 
of justifying rr class bias in thinking about social probIems. It 
is an ingenious scheme for reading a successful revolutionary 
result into the objective facts; and thus getting a chance to throw 
the weight of science--or something even higher than science-- 
on the side of the proletariat. This weight might itself con- 
ceimbly tip the scales in favor of the proletariat-just as a be- 
lief that he is going to gct well may help to cure a patient, no 
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this very limited utility of the b d c  f in the diaIe.de $otp&pocw 
is not worth a snap of the fingers compared to the adt~tagcs 
of a clear and undeluded scientific confrontation of fa- &ad , 
the corrcspondencc between Hook and Trotsky in Tk N* . 
Vol. 137, No. 3548; if you want to see what n murky an- qb 
unfruitful lucubrations you get into when you try to sdjwt &q 
relations between objective science and a frankly drrsd~hd 
sociology. Hook himself has been compelled to admit in @ 
long run (and this is one further sign of hope for him) thqf 
the class-bias in the Marxian economics lies only in a s c l c E t i q  
among objectively verifiable facts of those relevant to 'the prole 
tarian revolutionary purpose.* And, of course, the deliberate 
seIection of facts, or aspects of fact, relevant to a spcc%c pur- 
pose is not bias at all-much less dialectic p h i l o s o p h ~ u $  
merely applied science. 
That the evils of Talmudism, and all the other evils that 1 
have shown to flow from this metaphysical justification of preju- 
diced thinking, * * would be off set by the alight conceivable' gain 
to the revolution involved in getting it established in the scab 
of authentic science, seems to me a preposterous idea. How- 
ever, the question does not have to be settIed, for the issue does 
not arise. You cannot get a classbiased system of philosophical 
ideas into the seats of science. Science has grown too great and 
is too wtIl aware of its own nature. All you will accomplish 
by insisting on this mttaphyaical apotheosis of prejudice is to 
repel scientific minds in increasing numbers from the ranks of 
the revolution. -And that, in the effort to change the ownership 
of a gigantic and complex tcdrnical apparatus like the American 
machine of production and distribution without stopping or de- 
stroying it, is a strategic error so colossal as to push dl other 
considerations into the background. When Hook says frankly, 
as he does, that this thing, once so well advertised to us as 
scientific socialism, is not science, he gives the revoIutionists a 
fair warning that they have got to drop it or lose their fight. 
Sce his b k ,  Tmuardr Tkr Undmimdi~g of Karl Mwx,  pp. 108-9-10. 
** In the concluding chapter# of my bwlr, Marx And L& 
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MARXISM AND PRAGMATISM 
The second obstacle on Sidney Hook's road home to com- 
mon sense is the philosophy of pragmatism, or "instrumenta1- 
ism," in which as a disciple of John Dewey he believes. It is 
not only in order to defend dialectic materialism against science, 
but in order to identify it with "scienrific" pragmatism that 
Mr. Hook bas thrown all the insides out of it, leaving only the 
so-caUed "method of thinking." It is for the same purpose 
that he has cut down the application of that method to the 
social and moral sciences, and thrown out of it, moreover, eve y 
feature sbarply distinguishing it from a mature scientific proce- 
dure except one--the right of the thinker to a class bias. By 
these heroic operations he has arrived where he can say: 
"Marxism therefore appears in the main as a huge judg- 
ment of practice, in Dewey's sense of the phrase, and its truth 
or falsity (instrumental adequacy) is an experimentaI matter. 
Believing it and acting upon it helps to make it true or faIse."* 
That is the very end and goaI of Hook's whole operation 
upon dialectic materialism. Seeing that this philosophy in its 
crude nineteenth century form will no longer stand u p y o u  can 
no longer pretend that the world itself is with dialectic necessity 
achieving the aims of the revolution-he transforms it into a 
twentieth century philosophy, a more up-to-date method of ac- 
complishing the very same identification of theoretic truth with 
proletarian program-of-action. "Truth" itself, he cries, is noth- 
ing but the successful workmg of an idca; the process of verifica- 
tion is a making m e .  Or, to  put it in Dewey's own language: 
"The effective warking of an idea and its truth are the same 
thing-this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of 
truth, but its nature." 
There is a difference between Hook's program of action 
and Dcwey's, however. There was a difference, at least when 
Dewey's phiIosophy took form. Dewey brought over from Hegel 
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only the ideal of identifying theoretical and practical' m.&u8- 
ness. He never studied Manc; he did not accept the da8g 
gte; and he had no use for the dialectic. Sidney Hook not w& 
wants to identify the theoretical and practical consciotlmc~- 
philosophic knowledge, that is, with program of action-but ha: 
wants to identify with his philosophic knowledge the 
program of class struggle. That leads him to try not only to 
attribute Dewey's instrumental philosophy to Kad Marx, but 
also to try to graft the Marxian dialectic upon Dewey's instru- 
mental phiIosophy. 1 venture to predict that john D e w y  
whether pleased or displeased to be told that Karl Marx anti- 
cipated his most original thoughts-will at least never agree to 
father the dialectic part of Hook's Marxian pragmatism Dewey 
may be forced by the rapidy developing facts to accept the 
class struggle as a practical program of political action in the 
given situation. But it is too late for him-and moreover he 
is too canny and too close to the scientific point-of-vim--to trg 
to read that back into the universe as a half-hearted philosophy 
of being. X-Ie will find dialectic materialism, as a 4'judgment of 
practice," a little too "huge" to be proven true even by the suc- 
cess of the League For Independent Political Action. 
With that sole exception, however, the net result of Hook'@ 
heroic operations upon Mancism is to bring it into substantial 
identity with Dewey's pragmatism. Dewey and his pupil are at 
one in the belief that a special kind of thinking-whether "dia- 
lectic" or not--ought to prevail in the social, moral and politi- 
cal fields, and in giving to this thinking, no matter how "opera- 
tive and experimentat" it may become, the name of philosophy. 
It is just in these spheres, indeed, that, after denying the philoso. 
pher any special knowledge of "rcalityt'-to the horror of aU 
his professorial colleague+Dewcy still finds him a special func- 
tion over and above what the men of science have to do. It 
was, moreover, a preoccupation with moral and social problcms 
that led Dewey in the f i s t  place to work out his special "scien- 
tific" kind of pragmatism. I think it might be said that hir 
central prob1e-s o philosopher-has bcen to extend the 
volitional view of truth which seems natural in these ~phcres, 
because the experimenter is a part of the exptrinncnt, to the 
sphere of natural science, where the experimenter neerrm to bold 
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his txpcrimcnt off from him, and try his best to get a decision 
&at will be valid objectivety and whether he is there ox not. 
k my opinion, Dewey has not succeeded in accomplishing 
this. 1 think that when you state that "the effective working of 
an idea and its truth arc tbe same thing," you are stating a 
thing which you believe true in some other sense than because 
it is working effectively. And it is this other kind of truth, 
truth which is an attribute of the relation of an effectively work- 
ing idea to the facts worked upon, that natural scientists are 
trying to discover. I think the sense of a fluid union of the 
thinking mind with the matter thought about which Dewey ar- 
rives at through this definition of truth, and through his extra- 
ordinary temperament, although a fascinating speculative txpe- 
ritnce, is illusory. It  is but a last desperate attempt to keep up 
in the face of science-and by inserting it into the very procedure 
of scienc-orne vestige of that sense of some friendly coopera- 
tion between the objective world and the mind of man which 
has been the main concern of phiIosoplly from the beginning. 
Even in the social and moral sciences, it is possible to say 
that our believing and acting upon an idea helps to make it true 
only in so far as the definition of the idea is in some way incom- 
plete. If all the term of the problem an idea proposes to solve 
can be and are stated, then no such magicsounding thing will 
follow. This may be very well illustrated in the statements just 
preceding Sidney Hook's assertion that Marxism is a huge judg- 
ment of practice and that our believing helps to make it true. 
Let me quote the whole passage: 
" . . . The reading of history in terms of class struggle leads 
to its intensification; the theory of surplus value provided a 
powerful ethical motivation and rallying cry in industrial distress. 
Marxism therefore appears in the main as a huge judgment of 
practice, and its truth or falsity (instrumental adequacy) is an 
experimental matter. Believing it and acting upon it helps to 
make it true." 
But h e  truth of the reading of history in terms of class 
struggIe will not be affected by the success of the futurc experi- 
ment, except in so far as you did not make clear just what 
history you were taking about-whether past or future-and 
just how large a role you were attributing to the class struggle 
in it. Nor will the truth of the surplur d u e  theory be 
by the success of the revolution d e u ~  it is abstractly formulated 
with that end in view. If it reads a1 I have restated it h mj 
book: There is enough concrete fact underlying the abstract 
talk about surplus value to warrant wr going h e a d  with the 
class struggle and trying to win the revolution--then the 8Ue 
cess of the rcvoIutim only ~ O V G J  it true, for it w a s  true b t f o s  
'The thing becomes still more crudeIy evident in other pas- 
sages where Hook labots to get rid of that "myth of the hcv- 
itability" of communism which ht attributes to the deviators 
from Mam's philosophic views. 
"When Marx spoke of comrnunisrn as being st remit of 
'social necessity'," he sap,  "he was referring to the resultant 
of a whole social process, one of whose components was the da 
velopment of economic conditions, the other the assertion ;of a 
rtvolutionary class will."* In other words, when Marx said ncc- 
cssary, he meant possible. (It would be interesting to b o w  
through what peculiar mental or lingual adiction it came about 
that M a n  so often said "necessary" when he meant "pos~&lc." 
Both words are to be found in the German dictionary* It would 
also be interesting to know why, when his followtr~ mid "nec- 
essary," they did not mean possible, but meant necessary, and 
thus translated Marx's simple good sense into the "mythical 
language of the 'inevitability' of communi~rn.'~) 
Ho*ever, that is not my point at the moment. M y  pohh 
is that if you express your idea circumspectly--a8 for b 
stance, to say possible when you mean possible, and to say 
"such-and-such a result will follow if we do thukand*? 
when that is all you really know, then the idea is not "made 
true" by your successful action. It was true all the time and 
you have only proven it so. Tf, however, you express your ides 
loosely--as philosophers so often are compelled to do-and 
say, "Such-andduch a thing is going to happen," md then go 
and act in such a way that it does happen, why, it may be con- 
tended that you have made the idea tme. 
All this is rather rudimentary, and it is moreover old s d  
that has been answered by John Dewey to the satisfaction of 
disciples many times. It is just here, indeed, that we 
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d the ~ s t n t i a l  aetmce  between the "mgstica1 
of James and the f'sci~tific p~npat ism" of Dtwcy 
d the "truth" of an idea that had SUCCWS- 
slog over the edges of its meaning aa 
e terms of the s p d c  problem Aad 
d w c y ' ~  &men dtscipk, xareful repudiator, too, of 
pragmatism" of WiXam James, inf ~rming us that 
z ~ ~ ~ r & ~ ' ' . - - n o  more and no leas &an &at-''Mxlnr" is 
, J '"huge judgment of practice" that can be made true by be- 
1i.m and acting upon it. Marxism is indeed hug-probably 1 the hugest b4judgmmtg' wo. proven true by a spedbr lhr of I 
I aaim in a t m p r q  situation since Mom came down the 
'. mountah with the wards af the Eternal engraven in stom. 
r 
i For my part, I W it is no accident that one of John 
: Dewey's chusen di~ciplett =a effect such a manower with his 
I ddhitim of truth-and &at, top, with no proteet from the 
. 
master. I thiak-although 1 have not the space h e  to  prove 
i t 4 ~ t  Dewey's ''truth" is less mystical than that of Jim- 
anEy became Dewey's interests lie in ~s world and James had 
a strong flair for the next. Theg are both concerned aar philog* 
phe-d 1 dbtinguish the philasophtr in each from the grtat 
student of the human mind-+ defend a last vestige of animism 'I 
widat the hard dictates of &the acientik point-a£-view. T h  
are concerned to reconcile man's needs and wisheio with the proc- 
of the natural world by theorizing about truth, mi merely 
.b hdinpr out what the truth is and thanging the world 
It b indeed st very thin remnant of the animistic attitude 
that .Dewey gives us, and in stepping s u c ~ i v e l y  fram the name 
' 
"prrsgmatism" to "scientific pragmatism," and then to "hstrw- 
mtntdim," and finally wen abandoning that excellent word for 
the term "sperational logic" invemd by a physicist, it h a s  a b s t  
an air of apologizing for its thinnas and whhing to *ankh al- 
together. If it shodd vanish--if Dewey should by the grace 
of laatwe and experience porn to be not od? the first American 
pkiiil-r, but thc last philosopher*--we shodd hrmve a most 
precious thirsg left in the place of his definition of truth. We 
&odd have Itft the sage advice that, siacc the mind is such a 
fam@h of the body as it is, we must seek out the specific cle- 
a k h ~ X ~ P f h e l o l t r t ~ a m m " g t a ~ D d ~ e ~  
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merit of purpose in every idea that lays elrrim to 
and carefully and boldly know and understand 
beware of its false grandiose pretenses. It is upan, 
that I have acted in my analysis and restatement of 
theories, and it is for that reason that I a#a& 5 0  
the last stand of the priest-indisguise, this philosophy o 
pragmatism so ingeniously pieced together by Sidnty Hoe% 
of two of his most plausible decaying vestments. 
Marx's philosophy enabled a substantial relic of I 
to ride along upon the post-Newtonian science of tht BritSh 
and French enlightenment. Dewey's enables a morc meagre4 , . 
relic to ride along on Darwin and the post-Darwinian &cam. 
The two devices are not, and cannot be the same. And that b: '4 
why Hook contradicts hirnrself as well as the documents and 
'. the very possibilities of thought's history, in attempting to iden- 
tify them, tangling himself up in a very welter of desperately - 1  
schoIarly self-contradictions. But he does this bccaust he fe&, TI 
and feel truly, that one of their intimate motives and emotional r 
outcomes is the same--namely, to combine knowledgesf-fact 
with program-of-action, or, as he says in one of his own eloquent 
conclusions, "to fuse the logic of analysis with the poetry of 
passion." 
It is absolutely beyond a doubt that as experimental howl- 
edge develops and becomes more precise and convincing in the 
fields of psychology and sociology, these last attempts to stay 
the hand of science will go down, and we shall find itn morc 
cool but equally purpase-serving procedure, and its resolute, 
yet by no means negative, or passive, scepticism about ultimate 
problems, established in every department of being and dl prac- 
tical effort. Those who wish to preserve the rich contribution 
of Marxism to science will not be diverted by Hook's heroic 
effort to defend the husk of the Marxian philosophy. They 
will go back to the original intention of Karl Marx himself to 
have done with "philosophy" and try upon the basis of tmpixical 
scientific findings to revoIutionize the world, and they will carry . 
that intention through. 
your n m s  and address to 
S m ,  New York City. 

